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Determination of testamentary capacity involves not only application of standard tests for decisional 
competency but also consideration of such special factors as the testator’s “moral duty” to those entitled to 
her or his bounty (also referred to as “common obligations of life”), and the concept of emotional capacity. 
It is important for medical and legal practitioners who are involved in assessment of testamentary capacity 
to be aware of these special factors or requirements, their nature and their effect on the validity of the 
testator’s will. The relevant tests and special factors are examined from an historical perspective. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, suggested: 
[I]t might frequently be of use to families upon sudden emergencies, if the physician were acquainted with 
the doctrine of last wills and testaments at least so far as relates to the formal part of their execution.1 
 
Blackstone’s suggestion is as pertinent today as it was in 1765. The involvement of medical practitioners in 
the law of succession relates to the assessment of the testator’s mental capacity. Common law has adopted 
many aspects of the Roman testamentary law, including the requirement of legal capacity as a prerequisite 
of the will’s validity (ius testamenti faciendi).2 Indeed, Book 2.10 of Justinian’s Institutes begins with an 
etymologically absurd3 but telling statement: “Testamentum ex eo appellatur, quod testation mentis est” 
(“A testament is so called because it attests to the state of mind”). The required “state of mind” was that of 
“sound mind” (mens sana), which acquired a particular legal interpretation. 
 
Persons suffering from mental illness (furiosi) did not have capacity to make a will because they were 
devoid of reason (quia mente carent).4 A will made by an insane testator remained invalid even if he 
became sane (compos mentis) afterwards. However, if the will was executed during a lucid interval,5 it 
remained valid, as did a will made before the onset of a mental illness. For, according to Justinian’s 
Institutes, the validity of wills or any other acts duly executed is not nullified by supervening mental 
illness.6 In the Digest 28.1.2, the 1st century CE Roman jurist, Domitius Labeo, is quoted as stating: “In the 
case of someone who is making his will, at the time when he makes the will, soundness of mind is required, 
not health of the body.”7 These principles still govern the modern law of wills (see below). Though in 
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 561, Lord Cockburn CJ, having pointed out that Roman 
authorities are silent on “what shall constitute madness or  
 
* MA, PhD, LLM; Associate Professor, School of Law, Deakin University. 
1 Blackstone W, Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of the first edition of 1765-1769) Vol 1 (1765) p 14. 
2 Under Roman law, the testator, witnesses to the will, and the heirs under the will had to have legal competence in relation to 
will-making (testamenti factio). 
3 Lee RW, The Elements of Roman Law (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1956) p 191. 
4 Justinian’s Institutes, Book 2.12.1. 
5 For a modern example see Kantor v Vosahlo [2004] VSCA 235. 
6 Justinian’s Institutes, Book 2.12.1: “furiosi autem si per id tempus fecerint testamentum quo furor eorum intermissus est iure 
testati esse videntur, certe eo quod ante furorem fecerint testamento valente: nam neque testamenta recte facta neque aliud ullum 
negotium recte gestum postea furor interveniens peremit.” 
7 In eo qui testatur eius temporis, quo testamentum facit, integritas mentis, non corporis sanitas exigenda est. 
 
 
 
(2006) 14 JLM 157 
 
defectiveness of intelligence, sufficient to prevent the exercise of the testamentary right”, devised his own – 
still authoritative – tests for testamentary capacity (see below). 
 
The law of succession was always important, but it has become even more so with the rapid ageing of the 
Australian population8 and the corresponding increase in litigation between family members, beneficiaries 
and executors contesting the validity of wills (usually after the testator’s death, when the will is offered for 
probate). As in classical Rome, a testator’s capacity is determined by a judge or an administrative body 
empowered to make guardianship decisions. Unlike classical Rome, where it would have been rare for 
medical practitioners to act as expert witnesses,9 today medical practitioners, including psychiatrists, 
neurologists and geriatricians, are often asked to assist in ascertaining a testator’s decision-making 
capacity.10 
 
Medical practitioners are generally aware that determination of testamentary capacity involves the 
application of standard tests for decisional competency to make binding dispositions and directions. 
General tests for competency focus on cognitive ability to understand the subject-matter of the decision 
(memory, language, complex motor and sensory tasks as well as visual and spatial performance). However, 
even a cursory examination of the case law suggests that both lawyers and medical practitioners are less 
aware of such additional factors as the testator’s “moral duty” to those entitled to her or his bounty (also 
referred to as “common obligations of life”) and the concept of emotional capacity, which are often critical 
to the court’s assessment of the deceased’s testamentary capacity. These factors limit the doctrine of 
absolute right of the testator to dispose of her or his property by will, which has its origins in the 18th 
century.11 Today the doctrine of freedom of testamentary disposition is based on the concept of personal 
autonomy,12 and it is considered an “important human right of any person to dispose of his or her property 
as he or she thinks fit”.13 The general tests of decisional competency and specific elements of testamentary 
capacity are discussed in turn. 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DETERMINATION OF CAPACITY 
 
It is a fundamental rule in this area of the law that an individual’s capacity to make a will is a question of 
fact, whereas the assessment of whether the testamentary dispositions contained in the will are reasonable 
is a matter of law – and falls within curial discretion. 
When determining whether the testator had the required capacity at the time of making and executing the 
will, the court considers the whole evidence (both lay and medical) regarding the mental state of the 
deceased person and the surrounding circumstances. Medicine may provide a diagnosis and an explanation 
of the condition that impaired the person’s decision-making capacity; however, as Isaacs J pointed out in 
Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 572: “While … the opinions of the attesting witnesses that the 
testator was competent are not without some weight, the Court must judge 
 
8 According to the last census, in 2001, 12% of the Australian population was aged 65 and over. The life expectancy at birth of 
Australian males and females is 76 and 82 years respectively. See Australian Bureau of Statistics: http://www.abs.gov.au/ 
Ausstats/abs@.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/7DC312B50F92943ECA256B350010B3FF?opendocument viewed 19 
October 2006. 
9 In classical Rome most medical practitioners were either slaves or freedmen, who would not have had standing to either assess or 
testify in court. 
10 Appelbaum PS and Gutheil TG, Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law (2nd ed, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1991); 
Crowe S, “Forensic Neuropsychology” in Freckelton I and Selby H (eds), Expert Evidence (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1993-). 
11 Blumenthal SL, “The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America” (2006) 
119 Harv L Rev 959. 
12 Champine P, “Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity” (2006) 51 Villanova LR 25. 
13 Herszlikowicz v Czarny [2005] VSC 354 at [110] (Hargrave J). 
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from the facts they state and not from their opinions.”14 In other words, testamentary jurisdiction differs 
from other branches of the law, insofar as the medical opinion, though admissible, will be disregarded 
unless it concerns facts, specifically the testator’s “soundness of mind” at the time of making the will. 
 
Principally, testamentary capacity is presumed where the will has been duly executed, complies with all the 
formal requirements of the relevant legislation, and is rational on its face.15 This is because the law 
presumes that all adults of “sound mind” are legally competent.16 A competent adult can validly enter into 
binding contracts, make gifts, draw up a will, consent to or refuse medical treatment. Legal competence has 
three elements: 
• legal adulthood; 
• sound mind; and 
• ability to communicate one’s decisions. 
 
Thus, a will is not valid unless devised by an adult (a person of 18 years and over),17 who has legal capacity 
(sound mind).18 The concept of “sound mind” or, more precisely, “sound disposing mind”19 refers to the 
capacity of the decision-maker to understand, retain, believe and evaluate (ie, process), and weigh the 
information which is relevant to the will and dispositions therein.20 Since Roman times, the notion also 
involves the ability to understand the significance of one’s actions in terms of right or wrong.21 In the 
context of testamentary capacity, the requirement of sound mind involves, inter alia, adequate memory and 
understanding that is not unduly impaired by old age, enfeebled by illness, or affected by undue influence.22 
Subsequent suicide of the testator, though a consideration in the determination of whether a deceased had 
testamentary capacity, is not regarded as conclusive proof of testamentary incapacity.23 
 
Where the party contesting the will presents evidence that the testator lacked mental capacity, the 
propounder of the will has to show on the balance of probabilities that the deceased person at the 
 
14 His Honour referred to Durnell v Corfield (1859) 1 Sw & Tr at 402; 163 ER 961. See also Scattini v Matters [2004] QSC 459, in 
which Muir J rejected medical opinion stating that it was “highly unlikely … that the testator would have had capacity to sign the 
documents”. 
15 In Sutton v Sadler (1857) 3 CB (NS) 87 at 98-99; 140 ER 671 at 676 Cresswell J said: “If, indeed, a will, not irrational on the face of 
it, is produced before a jury, and the execution of it proved, and no other evidence offered, the jury would be properly told that they 
ought to find for the will, and, if the party opposing the will gives some evidence of incompetency, the jury may, nevertheless, if it 
does not disturb their belief in the competency of the testator, find in favour of the will: and in each case the presumption in favour of 
competency would prevail.” See also Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; Re Estate of Hodges (dec’d); Shorter v Hodges 
(1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 705; In Estate of TLB [2005] SASC 459 at [43] (Gray J). 
16 Legal competence or capacity and “sound mind” are legal, not medical, concepts. Hale M, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (E 
and R Nutt and R Gossling, Savoy, 1736) Vol 1, Ch 4, p 33: “In presumption of law every person of the age of discretion is presumed 
of sane memory, unless the contrary be proved; and this holds as well in cases civil as criminal.” 
17 Age of Majority Act 1977 (Vic), s 3; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 17; Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1970 (SA), s 3; Age of 
Majority Act 1972 (WA), s 5; Age of Majority Act 1973 (Tas), s 3; Age of Majority Act 1974 (ACT), s 5; Age of Majority Act 1974 
(NT), s 4; Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW), s 9. Under the Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 9, a married minor can 
make a valid will; a will made by a minor in contemplation of a marriage can only be validated if the contemplated marriage takes 
place. 
18 The testator must be of sound mind at the time of signing the will: Marquess of Winchester’s Case (1598) 6 Co Rep 23a; 77 ER 287; 
Arthur v Bokenham (1708) 11 Mod Rep 148. 
19 Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64 at 76; Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558. 
20 Greenwood v Greenwood (1790) 163 ER 930; Harwood v Baker (1840) 13 ER 117. 
21 Berger A, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1980) p 698. 
22 Smith v Tebbitt (1867) LR 1 P & D 398 at 400. 
23 In Estate of TLB [2005] SASC 459 at [46] per Gray J, who referred to American Jurisprudence (2nd ed, 1975) Vol 79, pp 358, 367 
and 387-388. On the facts of the case, his Honour found (at [47]) that the testatrix’s suicide of itself did not indicate “that she was not 
of sound mind when she gave instructions for the preparation of the will or that she lacked testamentary capacity at the time of her 
death”. According to the testator’s treating psychiatrist, at the time of making the will the deceased had testamentary capacity. 
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relevant time had the required testamentary capacity.24 In some cases, particularly where the testator was 
elderly or in a vulnerable position, an issue of duress or undue influence may arise, which, if established, 
has the effect of invalidating the disposition, even if the person was otherwise competent.25 Curial refusal of 
the grant of probate on the ground of the testator’s lack of testamentary capacity at the time of making the 
will means either intestacy or admission to probate of an earlier will.26 
 
Wills that have been substantially changed not long before the death of an elderly testator tend to be 
carefully scrutinised for testamentary capacity. The case of Norris v Tuppen [1999] VSC 22827 illustrates 
the importance of understanding the principles of testamentary capacity assessment by medical 
practitioners.28 In this case, the testatrix, Mrs Tuppen, was 88 when her husband died in December 1990. 
The couple were childless and wealthy (in 1996 the estate was valued at approximately $1,213,700). They 
both abused alcohol, and Mrs Tuppen’s health was frail. In early 1991 Mrs Tuppen made a will, which was 
substantially the same as an earlier (1982) will, except that by a codicil, she willed an Arthur Boyd painting 
to one of her husband’s nephews, Robert Tuppen, and a Rosenthal tea service to Robert’s sister. Robert 
Tuppen, who had been a solicitor, and was by then a magistrate, under powers of attorney did “a good deal 
of work” to put the late Mr Tuppen’s financial affairs back into order (at [11]). Then in September 1992 a 
new solicitor, Mr Lukaitis, who was suggested to Mrs Tuppen by another nephew, Digby Norris, prepared 
a third will, in which Robert Tuppen and his sister were removed from the will, and instead, Digby Norris 
received much of their share of the residue (as well as the Boyd painting and the Rosenthal tea service). 
There were also a number of new beneficiaries and different distributions. 
 
Although on its face the 1992 will appeared rational, Ashley J refused the grant of probate, on the ground 
that at the time of executing the third will, Mrs Tuppen lacked testamentary capacity.29 In his judgment, 
Ashley J accepted the evidence of Dr Wood, who was Mrs Tuppen’s treating psychiatrist, that she had mild 
to moderate dementia (she scored 18 out of 30 on the Folstein test) and had delusions, which principally 
involved a belief that her husband was alive. However, the principal reason for Ashley J’s finding that she 
was incompetent to draw the 1992 will was Dr Wood’s evidence that Mrs Tuppen had developed a 
paranoid set (ideation) against Robert Tuppen. Her allegations against Robert Tuppen, which were the 
reason for his removal from the third will, had no basis in reality, and her “paranoid set” prevented her 
from being able to evaluate and discriminate between the respective strengths of claims upon her bounty by 
the potential beneficiaries. This was particularly so in view of the medical evidence that dementia made 
Mrs Tuppen extremely susceptible to suggestions, and that she was unable to formulate her own opinions. 
There was also corroborated evidence that the testatrix was unable to remember much of what had gone on 
in the preceding five minutes, or even a lesser period. 
 
24 Barry v Butlin (1838) 1 Curteis 637 at 638: “the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a will; and he must 
satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument so propounded is the last will of free and capable testator”; Bailey v Bailey 
(1924) 34 CLR 558 at 570-574. 
25 For example, in Lyon v Howe (1868) LR 6 Eq 655 Ct of Chancery, transfers of tens of thousands of pounds to, and a will in favour 
of, Howe executed by Jane Lyon, a 75-year-old childless widow, were set aside. Sir GM Giffard VC found that Howe, who claimed to 
be a “spiritual medium”, exerted influence over Lyons by inducing in her a belief that she was fulfilling the wishes of her deceased 
husband, communicated by his spirit through Howe’s “mediumship” to make the transfers. 
26 Thus in Grynberg v Muller [2001] NSWSC 532, Hamilton J ruled that several wills made by the testatrix between 1986 and 1987 
were invalid because at the time she did not have testamentary capacity. His Honour admitted to probate a will made in 1985. 
27 Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au//cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/vic/VSC/1999/228.html?query=Norris%20v%20Tuppen viewed 20 
October 2006. Followed by Mandie J in Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Daulizio [2003] VSC 358 at [140]. 
28 Medical practitioners involved in the assessment of testamentary capacity need to be scrupulous in attending to their duties as 
assessors. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary proceedings and a finding of unprofessional conduct. See Re Gouras [2004] 
MPBV 10: http://medicalboardvic.org.au/pdf/DrGouras.pdf viewed 14 August 2006. 
29 This meant that the 1991 will became operative. 
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Mr Lukaitis knew that Dr Wood was Mrs Tuppen’s treating psychiatrist and that Dr Pick was her general 
practitioner for more than 30 years. Yet he asked his own general practitioner, Dr JFX Murphy, to assess 
Mrs Tuppen’s testamentary capacity on the day she executed her third will (at [78]). Ashley J noted (at 
[79]-[80]) that Mr Lukaitis’s covering letter to Dr Murphy was inaccurate, and that the solicitor “did not 
provide the doctor, who had never seen Mrs Tuppen before, with any of the medical reports” (which were 
in his possession). Dr Murphy did not seek any information about Mrs Tuppen’s clinical history, personal 
history or present treatment. He understood that his task “was to decide whether on the particular day Mrs 
Tuppen had testamentary capacity”. Dr Murphy diagnosed Mrs Tuppen as “essentially in the Alzheimer’s 
dementia realm”, but able to give fairly prompt, succinct and forthright answers to his questions. He noted 
short-term memory impairment but considered that Mrs Tuppen’s attention, concentration and long-term 
memory were “quite reasonable”, and that she was orientated in time, place and person.30 Mrs Tuppen gave 
him a “comprehensive run down of her family tree”, spoke of great fondness for Digby, and specifically 
desired to exclude Robert Tuppen – but not his children. Although Dr Murphy did not know whether Mrs 
Tuppen’s description of the family tree was in fact accurate, he opined that she possessed testamentary 
capacity on that day. 
In the course of cross-examination, Dr Murphy was asked whether it was part of his function to investigate 
whether what appeared to be realities to Mrs Tuppen were rational or irrational. Dr Murphy replied that he 
“respected her ability … to be as difficult or irrational about this” (the will) as she decided. He thought she 
was a “slightly sort of contentious woman”, determined to “get back” at Robert Tuppen, but apparently 
weighing up the other prospective beneficiaries in a very reasonable manner. Ashley J observed that Dr 
Murphy’s opinions were somewhat compromised “by his having no information – personal or medical – 
available when he interviewed Mrs Tuppen”. In particular, Dr Murphy was unaware that she had recently 
been observed by Dr Wood to have taken a paranoid set against Robert Tuppen, and that in the period from 
late 1991 onwards had made a series of irrational accusations against him.31 Moreover, according to his 
Honour, having grudgingly acknowledged that dementia, with loss of higher cortical function, generally 
involves at least some impairment of insight and judgment, Dr Murphy accepted at face value everything 
he was told by the testatrix about the claims of various potential beneficiaries. Ashley J concluded that Dr 
Murphy “seems not to have considered whether, by taking the approach that the testatrix was entitled to be 
as irrational as she chose, he was effectively closing off a line of relevant enquiry as to whether or not her 
decision-making capacity was impaired”. Ashley J’s conclusion reaffirms the rule articulated by Sir John 
Nicholl in Marsh v Tyrrell (1828) 2 Hagg Ecc 84 at 122; 162 ER 793 at 806: 
It is a great but not uncommon error to suppose that because a person can understand a question put to him, 
and can give a rational answer to such question, he is of perfect sound mind, and is capable of making a will 
for any purpose whatever, whereas the rule of law, and it is the rule of common sense, is far otherwise; the 
competency of the mind must be judged of by the nature of the act to be done, and from a consideration of all 
the circumstances of the case. 
Mrs Tuppen was diagnosed with dementia. Many patients with mild dementia have a syndrome known as 
“word-finding difficulty”, and are often unable to articulate ideas (expressive aphasia).32 If an adult lacks, 
whether permanently or at the time of making the will, ability to communicate in a coherent manner, he or 
she will be deemed incompetent.33 However, where the person is lucid and has capacity to communicate, it 
can be oral, via computer or by means of a coded system of nods, blinks or other bodily movements. Once 
drafted, a will can be validly executed by a mere mark. Thus in 
 
30 Though she was able to give her name and address, Mrs Tuppen was not sure of her age, gave her birth date incorrectly, nominated 
the year as 1991 instead of 1992, could not recall what month it was and nominated the wrong day of the week, but explained in detail 
the reasons for her desire to exclude Robert Tuppen from the will (at [83]). 
31 According to Ashley J, the case did not require him to determine whether ascribing all kinds of conduct to Robert Tuppen was the 
product of the testatrix’s own mind, or the product of Digby Norris’s suggestions. 
32 Helme R and Mendelson D, “Causation in Alzheimer’s Disease and the Law” in Freckelton I and Mendelson D (eds), Causation in 
Law and Medicine (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002) pp 270-289. 
33 Lord Goff of Chieveley in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 73-77. 
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Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558, the High Court (Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ; Knox CJ and Starke 
J dissenting) declared valid a will of an 88-year-old testator who, three days before his death on 17 May 
1923, too weak to write his name, executed his will by signing it with a mark. On 11 May 1923 he gave 
instructions to revoke all former wills (which favoured some of his children over others), and gave all his 
property upon trust for division equally between all his children.34 Though he did not explicitly mention it, 
Isaac J (at 572) adopted the Roman approach when he cited with approval Kent Ch in Van Alst v Hunter 5 
Johns Ch (NY) 148 at 158 (1821) who in turn was quoting from Henry Swinburne’s A Brief Treatise on 
Testaments and Last Wills,35 when he said that “a man may freely make his testament, how old soever he 
may be; for it is not the integrity of the body, but of the mind, that is requisite in testaments”.36 
 
BANKS V GOODFELLOW TESTS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
 
The classic exposition of the jurisprudence and test of testamentary capacity was provided by Lord 
Cockburn CJ in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549.37 In this case the testator, Mr John Banks, who 
died unmarried in 1865, made the will in 1863 in favour of his sister’s daughter, Margaret Goodfellow.38 
The will was contested by the son of the testator’s half-brother (also called John Banks), on the basis that it 
was invalid because in 1841 the testator was for some months confined in a county lunatic asylum, and 
though discharged, remained till his death subject to delusions (claiming that he was being molested by a 
man who was dead, and pursued by evil spirits). Nevertheless, he managed his own money affairs, and at 
the time of making the will was also negotiating the lease of one of his properties. The lawyer who drafted 
the will testified that Mr John Banks “fetched from his room a will which he had made in 1838, in favour 
of his sister, who had since died, and said he wished to give all his property to his niece, Margaret 
Goodfellow, in the same way” (at 552). 
The case was appealed from a jury’s finding that at the time of making the will, irrespective of his 
delusions, the testator had the required capacity. The question before the court (at 555) was whether 
“delusions arising from mental disease”, that neither “prevent the exercise of the faculties essential to the 
making of a will”, nor “interfere with the consideration of the matters which should be weighed and taken 
into account on such an occasion”, and which did not in point of fact have any “influence whatever on the 
testamentary disposition in question, are sufficient to deprive a testator of testamentary capacity and to 
invalidate a will”. 
Lord Cockburn (at 556) rejected those legal precedents,39 which held that “any degree of mental 
unsoundness, however slight, and however unconnected with the testamentary disposition in question, must 
be held fatal to the capacity of a testator” on the basis that they were based on the then current medical 
theory of mind being “one and indivisible”. Instead, his Lordship declared (at 560) that whatever is the 
“essence” of the mind, its faculties and functions such as the senses, the instincts, the affections, the 
passions, the moral qualities, the will, perception, thought, reason, imagination and 
 
34 The testator was admitted to a private hospital in a serious condition with pneumonia three weeks before his death. The attending 
medical practitioner testified that the patient did not show signs of “any mental weakness apart from that associated with the extreme 
physical weakness”. Dr Loughran “hazarded an opinion or guess, however, that the testator would probably not have thought of 
making a will if left entirely to his own initiative”: see Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 562. 
35 (John Windet, London, 1590), Pt 2, s 5. 
36 Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 570. In Van Alst v Hunter 5 Johns Ch (NY) 148 at 158 (1821) the testator was between 90 and 
100 years of age when he made his last will leaving all his lands to his sole surviving daughter and her child. His other grandchildren, 
who were left only a small share of the estate, unsuccessfully challenged the will on the ground of the incompetency of the testator. In 
his judgment, Kent Ch observed (at 159): “It is one of the painful consequences of extreme old age that it ceases to excite interest, and 
is apt to be left solitary and neglected. The control which the law still gives to a man over the disposal of his property, is one of the 
most efficient means which he has in protracted life to command attention due to his infirmities.” 
37 Followed in Australia in In Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197; Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277. 
38 Margaret Goodfellow died unmarried, and under age, in 1867; her heir at law was her half-brother, the defendant, who had no blood 
relationship to the testator. 
39Waring v Waring [1848] VI Moore 342; (1867) LR 1 P & D 398. 
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memory are distinct. Noting that the power of disposing of property in anticipation of death involves moral 
responsibility, Lord Cockburn (at 565) devised a test of testamentary capacity comprising of four 
cumulative elements (all must be present): 
It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall [1] understand the nature of the act and its 
effects; [2] shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; [3] shall be able to 
comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, 
[4] that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise 
of his natural faculties – that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring 
about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.40 
His Lordship then explained the reason for the fourth element (at 565, emphasis added): 
If the human instincts and affections, or the moral sense, become perverted by mental disease; if insane 
suspicion, or aversion, take the place of natural affection; if reason and judgment are lost, and the mind 
becomes a prey to insane delusions calculated to interfere with and disturb its function, and to lead to a 
testamentary disposition, due only to their baneful influence – in such a case it is obvious that the condition 
of the testamentary power fails, and that a will made under such circumstances ought not to stand. 
 
Persons suffering from an “insane delusion” will lack testamentary capacity, if their mind is “overpowered 
by delusions which utterly demoralize it and unfit it for the perception of the true nature of surrounding 
things, or for the discharge of the common obligations of life” (emphasis added). All delusions are false 
beliefs – that is, they have no foundation in reality. In Dew v Clark and Clark (1826) 3 Addams 79 at 90-
91,41 Sir John Nicholl stated that a “patient is said to be under delusion” wherever he “conceives something 
extravagant to exist, which has still no existence whatever but in his own heated imagination; and 
wherever, at the same time, having once so conceived, he is incapable of being, or at least being 
permanently, reasoned out of that conception”. More recently, “insane delusions” have been defined as 
beliefs and ideations that are “not capable of rational explanation or amenable to reason, and … [are] not 
explicable by reference to the subject person’s education and culture”.42 
Lord Cockburn emphasised – in the flowery language of the 19th century – that sometimes delusions are 
circumscribed, in the sense that a person may have delusions about a particular subject while being entirely 
rational about other matters. Indeed, according to his Lordship, a person is considered to have testamentary 
capacity if the “insane delusions” are of the kind that “leave the individual in all other respects rational, and 
capable of transacting the ordinary affairs and fulfilling the duties and obligations incidental to the various 
relations of life”. 
For example, in Wechsler v Du Maurier [2002] NSWCA 13, the deceased, Mrs Fiala, made a will in 
October 1995 (two years before her death), in which she devised her residual estate of over $6 million in 
the proportions of 60% to her daughter Mary Du Maurier and 40% to her daughter Katie Wechsler. The 
reasons for the unequal distribution were explained thus. In 1994, having given Mary and Katie equal gifts 
amounting to $1 million each over a period of five years, Mrs Fiala was told by Katie and her husband, Dr 
Wechsler, that the gifts she made to Katie resulted in a large dept to the Wechslers’ company of which she 
was a partner. The Wechslers told her that the debt had to be repaid with interest. Mrs Fiala accepted that as 
a result of her gifts to Katie she owed the Wechslers $779,000,43 but believed that Katie and Dr Wechsler 
should have either refused the gifts, or warned 
 
40 Numbers in square brackets added. 
41 In Dew v Clark and Clark (1826) 3 Addams 79, the testator at the age of 72 was examined by a commission (in the nature of a writ 
de lunatico inquiriendo issued by the High Court of Chancery), and found to be of unsound mind in 1821. The will, however, was 
made in 1818. It provided that most of his fortune of £40,000 should go to two nephews, and only a very small portion to his only 
daughter. She successfully challenged the will on the basis that the deceased lacked a sound disposing mind because he “conceived an 
irrational antipathy” towards her. 
42 Re Estate of Hodges (dec’d); Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 706 (Powell J); applied in Re Crichton (unreported, Sup 
Ct, NSW, Probate Division, 22 July 1994) and Re Crooks (unreported, Sup Ct, NSW, Probate Division, 4 December 1994). 
43 Mrs Fiala repaid Katie and her husband over $300,000 before she died (the interest was forgiven). 
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her in precise terms of the debt before accepting them. Mrs Fiala also believed that the demand of interest 
on the debt amounted to cheating. Katie challenged the validity of the will, claiming that at the time of its 
execution, Mrs Fiala lacked testamentary capacity because she was suffering from a delusion as to her 
daughter’s and Dr Wechsler’s character, and that this had a direct bearing on the (unequal) testamentary 
dispositions. Stein JA of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Hodgson JA and Foster AJA agreeing) 
affirmed the holding of Windeyer J, according to which Mrs Fiala’s belief that Katie and her husband had 
cheated or deceived her, or dealt with her improperly, may have been false; however, it was not a delusion 
but a mistaken view.44 These beliefs did not overwhelm Mrs Fiala’s judgment, the testatrix “was able to 
properly reflect and consider the claims of those who may be supposed to have claims on her bounty, and 
to determine in what proportions her property should be divided amongst the claimants” (at [41]). 
 
In Wechsler v Du Maurier, the court (at [26]) accepted evidence of Mrs Fiala’s treating psychiatrist that she 
did not suffer from any delusion in the clinical sense, or from any other condition which would 
compromise her capacity to make a will. However, the validity of a properly executed will may not be 
impeached even where the evidence points to some degree of cognitive impairment, or a psychiatric 
disorder, providing these conditions do not affect the testator’s emotional and moral capacity to discharge 
her or his “common obligations of life”. 
 
“COMMON OBLIGATIONS OF LIFE” AND EMOTIONAL AND MORAL CAPACITY 
 
The question whether the testator possessed emotional and moral capacity to create the will is critical to 
determining its validity. The concept of moral capacity refers to the “common obligation of life”, also 
called “natural duties”, whereby testators are expected to fairly and adequately provide for their families.45 
This concept too, goes back to the Roman law (the lex Falcidia, Digest 35.2.1.pr), which stipulated that 
close relatives (descendants, ascendants, brothers and sisters) must take “not less than a quarter” of what 
they would receive on intestacy.46 This was known as the “statutory share” (legitima portio) rule.47 Unless 
there were valid reasons for providing less than the statutory share, for outright exclusion or for unequal 
treatment of the next relations, the will was open to challenge on the ground that the testator disregarded his 
natural duties, and his will was “irresponsible”.48 In civil law countries, this rule found its modern 
expression in the institution of legitim (statutory right to a share of the deceased’s estate).49 Common law 
rejected the legitima portio rule in favour of the doctrine of freedom of testamentary disposition; however, 
under family maintenance legislation in each Australian State and Territory,50 a person for whom the 
deceased had responsibility to make “proper provision” has the right to make an application to the court to 
order that an adequate provision be made out of the estate of the testator for the claimant’s proper 
maintenance and support.51 
 
44 Stein JA (at [39]) cited the statement of Gleeson CJ in Easter v Griffıth (unreported, NSWCA, 7 September 1995), p 10) that “the 
law treats as critical the distinction between mere antipathy, albeit unreasonable, towards one who has a claim, and a judgment which 
is affected by a disorder of the mind”. 
45 Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191. In Wechsler v Du Maurier, for instance, the court noted (at [5]) that Katie’s 40% share of the 
residue amounted to about $2.4 million, and hence “was not a case of a testator making no provision for her child”. 
46 Justinian’s Institutes, Book 2.18.6,7. 
47 Metzger E, A Companion to Justinian’s Institutes (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998) p 98. 
48 De inoffıcioso testamento, Justinian’s Institutes Book 2.18. Roman law placed restrictions on the ability of women to make 
testamentary dispositions. 
49 See eg Planiol M (with collaboration of Ripert G), Treatise on the Civil Law No 3049 (11th ed, translated by the Louisiana State 
Law Institute, West Pub Co, St Paul, Minnesota, 1958) p 490. 
50 Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 91; Inheritance (Family and Dependants Provision) Act 1972 (WA), ss 6, 7; Family 
Provision Act 1982 (NSW), ss 7, 8; Family Provision Act 1970 (NT), ss 7, 8; Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT), ss 7, 8; Inheritance 
(Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA), ss 6, 7; Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas), ss 3, 3A; Succession Act 1981 (Qld), Pt IV. 
51 Herszlikowicz v Czarny [2005] VSC 354. For a discussion see McConvill J and Lambropoulos V, “A Moral Duty to Resolve: 
Making Sense of Family Provision in Victoria” (2005) 79 (12) LIJ 38. 
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In Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191, which involved a claim under Inheritance (Family and 
Dependants Provision) Act 1972 (WA), s 7(1), Gummow and Hayne JJ (at 218) criticised the use ofthe 
notion of “moral duty” or “moral obligation” owed by testators to their spouses and children as 
inappropriate – “liable to be misunderstood” – in relation to the interpretation of the modern family 
maintenance provisions.52 However, in the same case, Gleeson CJ explained (at 199-200) that the statutory 
phrase “proper provision” refers to the notion of “testamentary duty”, which historically “justified 
legislative interference with a free exercise of testamentary capacity, that is, the duty of a man to make 
provision for his wife and children, was seen as a moral duty”. His Honour added that “judicial explanation 
of what was meant by proper provision was based upon the idea of a moral obligation arising from a 
familial relationship”. Hargrave J of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Herszlikowicz v Czarny [2005] VSC 
354 followed a line of Victorian authorities when he reiterated (at [109]) the continuing relevance of moral 
duty as the idea that informs “the determination of the question whether a responsibility exists to make 
provision for a claimant” under the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic).53 
 
Although the relevance of the concept of “moral duty” to the family maintenance legislation is still to be 
refined, Green54 observed that at common law when assessing testamentary capacity, judges invariably 
employ moral obligation as an “an unarticulated standard”.55 Under Roman law, in assessing the adequacy 
of the claimant’s share under the will, account was taken of certain inter vivos gifts,56 as well as gifts 
specifically intended to and acknowledged as the share.57 This is also the approach of modern courts.58 
Green’s study of many cases of contested wills revealed that courts tend to uphold as valid testamentary 
dispositions which appear to have reasonable distribution of assets to the family, even though the conduct 
or medical/psychiatric condition of the testator may suggest quite severe impairment of testamentary 
capacity.59 Conversely, wills of testators who have been assessed as competent by medical practitioners and 
lay witnesses have been set aside, where the testator’s bounty was left to strangers rather than the family. 
 
An example of the “unarticulated standard” of moral obligation in determining testamentary capacity is the 
case of Sharp v Adam [2006] EWCA Civ 449. The testator, Mr Adam, who for nearly 20 years suffered 
from progressive multiple sclerosis (MS), died in 2002, aged 70. In June 2001 he changed his 1997 will, 
which left the residue of his estate to his two daughters. The 2001 will excluded his daughters, and the 
residue was left to two employees who worked for Mr Adam and managed his business for many years. 
Although at the time of making the will, the testator was paralysed from the neck downwards, his carers, 
two solicitors and a general practitioner, all of whom had regular contacts with the deceased and were 
present when he made the 2001 will, testified that he had sufficient understanding to make a valid will and 
to communicate his instructions for it (at [4]). Nevertheless, Lord May MR (Jacob LJ agreeing) preferred 
the opinions of two medical witnesses who had never seen Mr Adam. One, Professor Ron, opined that the 
testator probably did not have testamentary capacity in June 2001; while the other, Dr Hawkes, was 
“satisfied” that, despite the 
 
52 Their Honours examined a number of authorities, including the observation of Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ in Singer v 
Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 209, that “references to ‘moral duty’ or ‘moral obligation’ may well be understood as amounting to 
a gloss on the statutory language” (in this case, the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW)). 
53 Hargrave J cited Lee v Hearn (2005) 11 VR 270; [2005] VSCA 127, particularly statements of Callaway JA at [54] and Buchanan 
JA at [57]. 
54 In his seminal article Green MD, “Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise” (1944) 53 Yale LJ 271 at 
277. 
55 See also Grey v Harrison [1997] 2 VR 359 at 365 per Callaway JA, cited in Herszlikowicz v Czarny [2005] VSC 354 at [108]. 
56 Justinian’s Institutes, Book 2.18.6. 
57 Codex 3.28.35.2. Metzger, n 47, p 99. 
58 Hughes v National Trustees, Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 147-148; Singer v Berghouse 
(1994) 181 CLR 201 at 207-208. 
59 Green MD, “The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills” (1943) 21 Texas L Rev 554; Green MD, 
“Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency – A Study in Related Concepts” (1943) 43 Col L Rev 176; Green MD, “Judicial 
Tests of Mental Incompetency” (1941) 6 Missouri L Rev 141. 
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presence of MS, “at the time he gave instructions for the Will (1 May 2001) and at the time of final 
execution of the Will (1 June 2001), he was of testamentary capacity as defined by Banks v Goodfellow … 
and understood the content and consequences of his final Will”. 
 
However, Dr Hawkes also expressed concern that the 2001 will marked “an abrupt change of plan” one 
year before the testator’s death, noting: “This might be considered irrational conduct and indeed I am sure 
his daughters would believe that to be the case. As a lay observer I do find it odd that he did not leave a 
penny to his two daughters.” 
The court agreed, declared the 2001 will invalid (which meant that the 1997 will became operative), on the 
ground that Mr Adam lacked testamentary capacity. According to Lord May MR (at [93]): 
[[T]he fourth element in Banks v Goodfellow – “poison his affections, pervert his sense of right or prevent the 
exercise of his natural faculties”, “no insane delusions …” – is concerned as much with mood as with 
cognition. 
Referring (at [72]) to the passage in Banks v Goodfellow which speaks of “an obligation of the moral law” 
as remaining “essentially true today”, Lord May MR pointed to the total exclusion of Mr Adam’s daughters 
from the will, and answered in the affirmative the question whether “the damage to Mr Adam’s mind 
resulting from multiple sclerosis deprived him of the necessary clarity of thought to enable him to make a 
rational decision or affected his natural feelings for his daughters or his sense of right”. 
 
Between 1 May and 1 June, Mr Adam’s solicitors, as well as his medical practitioner, tried to persuade him 
to include his daughters in the will. While placing great emphasis on the testator’s cognitive capacity, they 
did not consider the issue of his “moral obligations” to the daughters – had they advised him that by 
excluding his children he created a risk of the will being declared invalid, he would probably have made 
some provision for them (Mr Adam at one stage contemplated leaving the house to the two daughters). 
 
EMOTIONAL CAPACITY 
 
The standard for determining the existence of testamentary capacity is subjective. The question is not how a 
reasonable person in the shoes of the testator would have decided to dispose of the property in question, but 
what the actual testator would have done, absent the “disorder of mind”. As noted, a “disorder of mind” 
may involve either cognitive impairment or an emotional disturbance. In Sharp v Adam Lord May MR 
noted (at [93]) that the test in Banks v Goodfellow “is concerned as much with mood as with cognition”. 
His Lordship did not elaborate; however, the reference to “mood” suggests the notion of diminished 
emotional capacity (through depression or other mood-altering conditions), which may influence the 
testator’s disposition of the property in a way in which he or she would not have done otherwise. Disease at 
any stage of life is frequently accompanied by stress and/or pain, productive of depression, which may 
impair the patient’s ability to function competently in evaluating information and making decisions.60 Mild 
to moderate dementia is frequently co-morbid with depression.61 Consequently, when assessing the 
testamentary capacity of a demented person in the period of a lucid interval, medical practitioners need to 
ascertain (i) whether the patient’s decisions and statements adequately reflect her or his affective state; and 
(ii) whether the cognitive and affective changes stemming from dementia and depression have deprived the 
patient of testamentary capacity 
 
60 Sprung CL and Winick BJ, “Informed Consent in Theory and Practice: Legal and Medical Perspectives on the Informed Consent 
Doctrine and a Proposed Reconceptualisation” (1989) 17 Crit Care Med 1346; Winick BJ, “Voluntary Hospitalisation after Zinermon 
v Burch” (1991) 21 Psych Annals 584. 
61 A person’s “affect” refers to her or his immediate emotional experience. In psychiatric practice, subjective affective sensations such 
as pleasure, displeasure, irritation, etc, as reported by the patient, are equivalent to symptoms; the observed mood and affective display 
(anger, joy, sadness, hurt, etc) serve as objective signs. The term “mood” refers to a more sustained and less flexible mental state over 
a longer period of time. In depression, the affective sensations are often shallow, inadequate or flattened: Ketal R, “Affect, Mood, 
Emotion and Feeling: Semantic Considerations” (1975) 132 Am J Psychiatry 1215. 
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by “poisoning” her or his attachment and solicitude to close relatives.62 As Ashley J pointed out in Norris v 
Tuppen, it is the role of the psychiatrist to ascertain whether what appears to be a reality to the testator is 
rational or irrational (has no basis in fact). 
To sum up, the test for testamentary competence includes moral, emotional and cognitive capacity: all three 
aspects of competence must be present at the time the testator executes the will. In making a will, a testator 
must understand the concept of the will, the nature of testamentary disposition and its effects, the extent 
and value of the property being disposed of,63 and appreciate the claims of possible beneficiaries.64 When 
assessing testamentary capacity, the medical practitioner has to consider the patient’s cognitive and 
emotional capacity specifically in the context of making the will, aware of the fact that unless close 
relatives of the testator have been adequately provided for (either through gifts inter vivo or under the will), 
its dispositions may be open to challenge. 
 
Danuta Mendelson 
 
62 Re Estate of Hodges (dec’d); Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698. 
63 Re Beaney (dec’d) [1978] 1 WLR 770; Grynberg v Muller [2001] NSWSC 532. 
64 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 565; In Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197 at 199. 
